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THE INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT ACCOUNTING CONTROLS 
ON SUBORDINATES' BEHAVIOUR AND PERFORMANCE 
Abstract Prior research suggests that goal setting and an emphasis en meeting tight 
budget targets may influence the extent of subordinates' performance and slack creation. 
This study hypothesizes that other accounting controls may moderate these relationships. 
Specifically, it hypothesizes that: (i) budgetary performance is increased and (ii) 
budgetary slack creation is decreased when an emphasis on setting and meeting tight budget 
targets is complemented with a high extent of cost control. The results support a significant 
two-way interaction between Emphasis on setting and meeting tight budget targets and Cost 
control affecting budgetary performance. A significant two-way interaction between 
Emphasis en setting and meeting tight budget targets and Cost control affecting the 
propensity to create slack was also found for production managers. Marketing managers' 
propensity to create slack was found to be associated only with Emphasis en setting and 
meeting tight budget targets. 
Keywords: Tight budget targets, cost control, performance, slack. 
THE INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT ACCOUNTING CONTROLS 
ON SUBORDINATES' BEHAVIOUR AND PERFORMANCE 
Prior studies suggest that the setting and meeting of tight and attainable budget targets 
may be associated with subordinates' performance and budgetary slack creation (Becker & 
Green, 1962; Locke & Latham, 1984; Kren & Liao, 1988). The setting and meeting of tight 
but attainable goals may encourage subordinates to internalize budget goals, leading to a 
higher level of aspiration, motivating subordinates to exert a disproportional amount effort 
to attained the budgets, thereby improving their performance. High reliance en meeting 
budget targets as a criterion for evaluating subordinates' performance may provide the 
incentive for subordinates to create budgetary slack (Hopwood, 1972; Onsi, 1973; Canunann, 
1976; Merchant, 1985a; Dunk, 1993). 
Emphasis en meeting budget target however is only one of the many types of accounting 
controls existing in organizations (Simons, 1987). Whilst there is empirical evidence to 
support the expectation that an emphasis en tight budget targets interact with different 
busines~_strategy to affect performance (Simons, 1987), the interaction between an emphasis 
en tight budget targets and other types of accounting controls affecting subordinates' 
performance and dysfunctional behavior have not been previously explored. In particular, 
the moderating effects of other compensatory accounting controls, such as cost control, that 
may be implemented jointly with an emphasis en setting and meeting tight budget targets 
have been omitted in prior studies. 
Accounting controls constitute an important form of controls existing in many organization for 
motivating subordinates and influencing their behaviour (Lawler & Rhode, 1976; 
Flamholtz, 1979; Euske, 1984, Merchant, 1985b). Merchant (1985b) regards the accounting 
information system as useful for control purpose because they provide information that is 
useful for motivating, monitoring, and decision making. However different forms of 
accounting controls may affect subordinates' performance and behavior differently. Chow, 
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Kato & Merchant (1996, p.179) argue that "Controls can serve as complements or substitutes 
for one another, and they also may differ in both magnitude and area of impact." This 
suggests that organizations may need to implement different forms of accounting controls 
simultaneously to achieve the desired outcome and behaviour. Hence accounting controls, 
such as the extent of budget emphasis in performance evaluation should not be viewed in 
isolation, but as a total package of accounting controls along with other nonaccounting 
controls to achieve the organizational objectives (Otley & Berry, 1980; Otley, 1980; 
Flamho!tz, 1983; Merchant, 198Sb; Macintosh & Daft, 1987; Chow et al., 1996). For 
instance, Macintosh & Daft (1987, p.50) argue that accounting controls " ... may seem an ad-
hoc collection of techniques and mechanisms, but in many cases they are the tangible 
elements of a strategy to create an integrated organization control package." This suggests 
the need to explore the impact of the moderating effects of other accounting control oo the 
relationships between an emphasis oo tight budget targets and subordinates' performance 
and dysfunctional behavior. 
Different fonns of accounting controls occur at various phases, namely, at the planning 
phase, during the implementation phase and after the implementation phase. Two forms 
of common accounting controls, namely, planning and cost control, are necessary for control 
systems to be effective. Homgren, Foster & Datar (1997, p.4) define planning as "choosing 
goals, predicting results under various ways of achieving those goals, and then deciding 
how to attain the desired goals"; and control as "action that implements the planning 
decision and the performance evaluation of the personnel and operations." The 
management accounting literature suggests that effective planning and effective control are 
both crucial for achieving organizational objective (Welsch, 1976; Homgren et a/.,1997). 
Effective planning ensures that goals are carefully chosen and effective control ensures that 
the chosen plan of action is implemented accordingly, thereby ,ensuring that the chosen 
goals are attained Planning without the complementary control will be unsuccessful. 
Similarly, controls are not meaningful unless proper planning is in place. This suggests that 
whilst an emphasis on tight budget targets may be a necessary condition for improving 
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subordinates' performance and minimize subordinates' dysfunctional behaviour, it may not 
be the only condition. An effective cost control system must also be in place to complement 
the tight budget target set. To-date, these relationships have remained largely untested. 
Since planning and cost control constitute two of the most common forms of accounting 
controls, ... better understanding of their effects en subordinates' performance and behaviour 
will have important theoretical and practical implications. 
In the next section, the relevant studies are examined to develop a theoretical basis for the 
hypotheses to be tested. The following sections respectively describe the method, results 
and their implications for theory and practice. 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Role of accounting systems in restricting slack creation 
Birnberg, Turopolic & Young (1983) suggest that accounting controls can be used by superiors 
to influence subordinates' behaviour. The importance of management accounting as a control 
system is also emphasized in agency framework. Agency theories suggest that an agent 
(subordinate), acting in self-interest, is capable of engaging in dysfunctional behaviours 
known as adverse selections and moral hazards (Baiman, 1982). The principal (superior) 
relies on accounting control system to influence or control the agent's actions. Since the agent 
attaches disutility to effort, the agent will attempt to create slack (regarded as a form of 
shirking), to maximize utility, as slack permits less effort to be expended. As slack is 
regarded as an inefficiency or a loss that occurs because of asymmetric pre-decision 
information (Scapens, 1991), and as the principal is also a utility maximiser, the principal 
will attempt to solicit the optimal effort from the agent through the choice of the 
information systems, including the use of accounting controls. 
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The principal can use accounting control systems in several ways to counter slack and 
improve performance. First, the principal can bargain with agent to set standards and 
targets considered acceptable to the former. Second, the principal can install accounting 
controls to monitor and report on the agent's effort. Pope (1984) suggests that a major form of 
counter-bias, which can impose significant restrictions on subordinates' ability to create 
slack, is the use of controls over the quality of information. He argues that "audit 
verification procedures implemented by the owner, penalties for estimation errors and even 
zero-based budgeting can all be viewed as formal controls en the quality of the information 
communicated to the owner ... To the extent that such controls are effective ... biasing will be 
unattractive" (p.57). This suggests that the more sophisticated and intense are accounting 
controls, the less successful will be subordinates' attempts to create slack. 
Both moral hazard and adverse selection are the consequences of information asymmetry 
because of the principal's inability to measure or infer whether the agent has expended the 
appropriate amount of effort or selected the optimal decisions. A number of researchers 
(e.g., Schiff & Lewin, 1970; Otley, 1978; Young, 1985; Dunk, 1993) suggest that information 
asymmetry is likely to lead to a higher incidence of budgetary slack creation. Otley {1978, 
p.145), for instance, argues that "the essence of the control problem .. .is that there is a 
degree of uncertainty in what constitutes an appropriate standard of performance for an 
organizational unit, but that uncertainty is often greater to the superior than the 
subordinate, who is more closely involved .... The so-called game of budget control...is 
played in the area of uncertainty that lies between a superior's knowledge of a specific 
situation and that possessed by his subordinate". Hence, any measures, which reduce the 
amount of information asymmetry, are likely to reduce the agent's dysfunctional behavior, 
including slack creation. Since accounting control systems ( such as the planning systems, 
the reporting systems and monitoring procedures), are based en information use1, they are 
likely to increase the amount of knowledge available to the superior. The possession of 
more information is likely to increase the superior's ability to detect slack creation by the 
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subordinates. If subordinates are aware that the superior has the ability to detect slack, 
they are less likely to create slack. Hence their propensity to create slack will be reduced. 
Role of accounting controls in improving perfonnance 
Apart from reducing propensity to create slack, accounting controls may also lead to better 
subordinates' budgetary performance. Budgetary performance is defined as the extent of 
success by the subordinates to meet budgeted targets. Budgetary performance is high if the 
subordinates' actual performance is close to or better than budgeted performance. 
Since accounting controls are likely to reduce the extent of subordinates' propensity to create 
slack, budgets are also likely to be accurately and realistically set. Accurate budgets, in 
turn, are likely to lead to better budgetary performance as subordinates are likely to view 
accurate budgets as realistic and attainable and hence are likely to be motivated to meet 
the budgeted targets (Becker & Green, 1962; Otley, 1978). Becker & Green (1962) suggest 
that when subordinates view budgets as accurately and realistically set, they are also 
likely to internalised the budget targets, leading to higher level of aspiration, which, in 
tum, will motivate subordinates to put in more effort to try to achieve the budgeted targets. 
In his study of superior's evaluative styles and budgetary performance, Otley (1978) also 
found that subordinates' budgetary performance was positively associated with superior's 
evaluative styles that emphasized the importance of meeting the budgets (budget 
constrained style). However, he also found that better budgetary performance was also 
associated with more accurate and realistically set budget targets. He concluded that the 
better budgetary performance was not the consequence of the evaluative style, but rather 
was caused by budget targets that were more accurately and realistic set . He explained the 
relationship as follows: "It therefore appears that a major reason for performance being 
closer to budget when budgetary means of evaluation are stressed is not so much that 
performance improves, but that the budget is set at more realistic levels ... such realism in 
budgets is also associated with performance that is acceptable .... " (pp 138-139). As an 
important purpose of accounting controls is to enhance the accuracy of accounting and budget 
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information, accounting controls are therefore likely to improve the accuracy of budget 
targets, and following Otley's argument, more accurate budgets are likely to be associated 
with improved subordinates' budgetary performance. 
"Path-goal" theory also suggests the importance of financial controls as a motivation 
device for better performance particular! y among higher level management (Georgopoulos, 
Mahoney & Jones, 1957; Ronen & Livingston, 1975; Macintosh, 1994). For instance, 
Macintosh (1994) suggests that "at upper levels, where role ambiguity runs high, managers 
will welcome financial controls because their jobs are rife with uncertainty, ambiguity and 
conflict. Here, financial controls, such as budgets, delineate managers' relationship with 
their superiors, provide a communication channel with subordinates and help define 
patterns of authority and responsibility. Financial controls help these managers to 
identify their goals as well as the proper path to reach them ... Not surprisingly, surveys 
usually reported that upper level managers hold positive attitudes toward financial 
controls." (p.35) (emphasis added). Hence, accounting controls are therefore hypothesized 
to be positively associated with senior level managers' budgetary performance. 
Operationalise of planning and control 
Analyzing the results from his survey of 76 firms, Simons (1987) identifies 10 different 
accounting control attributes. The two control system attributes of interest to this study are 
"Emphasis m tight budget targets" and "Cost control" which are used to operationalise 
planning and control, respectively. 
Simons' accounting attributes are used by this study to operationalise accounting controls for 
several reasons. First, Simons' framework allows more than a single form of accounting 
control to be evaluated. Second, Simons' instrument covers a broader range of documents and 
forms of controls than other available instruments, for instance, the Macintosh & Daft 
(1987) instrument. Simons' instrument also permit controls to be classified on a purpose-
basis (e.g., cost control, results monitoring, external scanning) rather than just on the type of 
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documents as in the case of the Macintosh & Daft instrument (e.g. budget, statistical 
reports, standard operating procedures). Additionally, the identification of different 
forms of controls through an factor analysis by Simons, permits a more selective list of items 
only, rather than the entire 33-item questionnaire, to be use in the present study. The 
classification of items into different forms of controls also permits the validity and 
reliability of the instrument to be verified. 
Emphasis on tight budget targets Emphasis en tight budget targets is related to the 
tightness and accuracy of departments' budget goals, the importance attached to the 
meeting budgeted targets and the achievement of operating efficiencies and the use of 
summary measures of departmental performance. Departments with a high Emphasis en 
tight budget goals would attempt to set accurate and tight budget goals, require 
subordinates to meet these tight budgeted targets and achieve operating efficiencies and 
use overall summary measures to measure departmental performance. 
Cost control Cost control is defined by Simons (1987) as the extent to which cost analysis 
techniques and control are used. Departments with high Cost control would control 
departmental operations by setting up cost centers, perform variance analysis and monitor 
closely all operations and tasks in the department. The use of cost centers and variance 
analysis are essential aspects of responsibility accounting which not only highlight 
deviations of actual performance from budgets, but also enable the superior to pinpoint the 
department and the individual responsible for the deviations and potential problems 
areas. This, together with control systems which monitor all tasks and operations, is 
likely to make it difficult for subordinates to conceal any failure to meet budgeted targets. 
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Two-way interaction between Emphasis on tight budget targets and Cost control 
High Emphasis on tight budget targets - high Cost control situations 
By itself, a high Emphasis on tight budget targets may not lead to a decreased propensity 
to create slack or improved budgetary performance. A high Emphasis on tight budget 
targets is li.'.,ely to be effective only when it is accompanied by a high extent of Cost control. 
Control refers to actions taken to achieve plans and involves the measurement of progress 
when plans are implemented and the triggering of actions to correct or prevent any 
deviations of actual performance from the budgets. However, control presupposes the 
existence of effective planning. Without effective planning, control is meaningless. 
Similarly, without effective control, planning is meaningless as budgets are unlikely to be 
achieved. Effective planning and control must both occur before budgets can be achieved. 
Consequently, Emphasis oo tight budget target is likely to interact with Cost control to 
affect subordinates' propensity to create slack and budgetary performance. When 
Emphasis oo tight budget target and Cost control are both high, it is likely that the 
superior is highly committed to using the accounting control system to achieve 
organizational objectives. The setting of accurate and tight budget targets is likely to be of 
paramount importance to the superior. In such situations, the superior is likely to view 
slack creation unfavorably and is likely to intensify efforts to discourage slack creation. 
When both control system attributes are high, the intensity and the sophistication of the 
accounting controls in place are like! y to make it difficult for subordinates to create slack. 
Subordinates are likely to be unable to create slack. Since slack creation is not easy, 
propensity to create slack is likely to be low. Moreover, because of the increased attention 
on meeting tight budget targets, subordinates' budgetary performance is also likely to be 
high. 
High (low) Emphasis on tight budget targets - low (high) Cost control situations 
In contrast, in situations when Emphasis oo tight budget targets is high (low) and Cost 
control is low (high), the superior is likely to be less committed to using the accounting 
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controls to restrict slack creation or to improve budgetary performance. Since it is likely 
that both accounting controls must be present before slack creation can be restricted and 
budgetary performance improved, it is plausible that slack creation will be possible when 
only one of the accounting control is present. Additionally, the presence of any one of the 
accounting controls is likely to be enough to pressure subordinate to increase slack creation. 
For instance, when Emphasis on tight budget target is high, subordinates are under pressure 
to create slack because the importance attached to meeting the budget, coupled with the 
tight budget targets, are likely to require a high level of effort from the subordinates. 
Similarly, a high extent of Cost control directs the superior's attention to the subordinate 
responsible for any deviations from the budget. Subordinates are therefore likely to be 
under pressure to avoid having unfavorable variances. Hence, they are likely to create 
more slack under high Cost control situation than low Cost control situations to avoid the 
negative stigma associated with unfavorable variances. 
Hence, whilst the presence of both Emphasis on tight budget targets and Cost control makes 
it difficult for subordinates to create slack because of the high intensity and sophistication 
of the accounting controls, the presence of only one of the controls is likely to make it 
possible for subordinates to create slack because of the lower intensity and sophistication of 
the accounting controls. This, coupled with the pressure to create slack, is likely to lead to 
a high propensity to create slack. 
Low Emphasis on tight budget targets - low Cost control situations 
Finally, when Emphasis on tight budget targets and Cost control are both low, the superior 
is likely to place little importance to accounting controls to achieve organizational 
objectives. Subordinates are therefore likely to be under no pressure or have any incentive to 
create slack. Consequently, propensity to create slack is likely to be low. Since there is a 
lack of attention en the budgetary system by the superior, subordinates are unlikely to be 
motivated to achieve high budgetary performance. Hence, budgetary performance is also 
likely to be low. 
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Based oo the above discussion, the following null and related alternative hypotheses are 
tested: 
Ho1 There is no significant interaction between Emphasis on tight budget 
targets and Cost control affecting subordinates' Propensity to create 
budgetary slack. 
HAI Emphasis on tight budget targets interacts significantly with Cost control 
to affect subordinates' Propensity to create budgetary slack. 
Ho2 There is no significant interaction between Emphasis on tight budget 
targets and Cost control affecting subordinates' Budgetary performance. 
HA2 Emphasis on tight budget targets interact significantly with Cost control to 
affect subordinates' Budgetary performance. 
Functional differentiation of activities 
Researchers (e.g., Galbraith, 1973; Govindarajan, 1986; Kren & Liao, 1988) suggest that 
• budgetary slack is a function of uncertainty. Since the levels of environmental uncertainty 
(Thompson, 1967; Hayes, 1977; Brownell, 1982, 1985) as well as the level of task uncertainty 
(Thompson, 1967; Hirst, 1981, 1983; Brownell & Hirst, 1986; Mia & Chenhall, 1988) faced 
by the production function and the nonproduction functions (e.g., marketing) are likely to 
differ, it is plausible that the results pertaining to the above hypotheses may be influenced 
by functional differentiation. The appropriateness and hence the extent of reliance and use 
of budgetary controls may also vary between different functional areas (Lawrence & Lorsch, 
1967; Hayes, 1977). Thompson (1967) suggests that since accounting control systems are 
generally "arbitrary" and "socially invented", they are appropriate only " ... when 
technologies are instrumentally perfected, and task environments stable or well buffered" 
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(p.93). Since the production function faces a more homogeneous and stable environment than 
nonproduction functions such as marketing, accounting controls may be relied upon more in 
the production departments than in marketing departments to measure subordinates' 
performance. Similarly, Brownell (1982) suggests that "within the organization, the locus 
of influence in decision making varied depending en the subenvironment faced by major 
functional divisions. Boundary-spanning divisions, such as marketing, were characterized 
by a much broader base of decision-making influence and control than those divisions 
relatively buffered from the external environment, such as production" (p.129). 
Empirically, Otley (1978) attributes his conflicting results with those of Hopwood (1972) 
partly to the different type of operating units examined in the two studies. He examined 
profit centers whilst Hopwood (1972) examined mainly cost centers. Similarly, Brownell 
and Hirst (1986) emphasize the importance of the difference in their sample compared 
with that of Brownell (1982). Whilst Brownell (1982) examined mainly production 
personnel, Brownell & Hirst's (1986) sample was more heterogeneous and their results are 
stronger for the production subsample than for the nonproduction subsample. Hayes (1977) 
results indicate strong support for his proposition that internal variables are the major 
explanators of production department performance; whereas environmental variables are 
most important in the explanation of the marketing department performance. Based en 
these results, he concludes that accounting based performance evaluation measures are 
• appropriate for production managers, but not for marketing and research and development 
managers. Brownell's (1985) results indicate that participation is more effective in 
enhancing the performance of R & D departments than marketing departments. 
Macintosh & Daft (1987) similarly found that departmental interdependence is related to 
the emphasis placed en different forms of controls, with standard operating procedures 
being more intensely used when interdependence was low; budget and statistical reports 
being important when interdependence was moderate; and all forms of controls (standard 
operating procedures, budget and statistical reports) being less important when 
interdependence among departments was high. Finally, Mia & Chenhall (1994) found that 
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functional differentiation of activities interacts significantly with broad scope MAS 
information to affect performance. The impact of broad scope information on performance is 
stronger for the marketing function than for the production function, a result they attribute 
to the task uncertainty differences between production and marketing. 
Hence there is strong theoretical justification as well as empirical evidence to suggest that 
functional differentiation may influence the impact of accounting and budgetary controls. 
Since Emphasis en meeting tight budget targets and Cost control are both related to 
budgeting and accounting based control systems, it is probable that the models developed in 
this study may be more applicable to the production function than to nonproduction functions 
such as marketing. Hence, apart from the combined sample (production and marketing 
combined), the results of this study are also analyzed separately for the production and the 
marketing subsamples. 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
A survey methodology involving a mailed questionnaire was used to test the hypotheses. A 
total of 237 manufacturing companies located in the Australian States of Victoria (117 
companies) and New South Wales (120 companies) each employing more than 100 
employees were selected randomly from Kompass Australia 1993/94.2 
As this study was designed to also examine the production departments and the marketing 
departments separately, only companies with more than 100 employees were selected since 
companies with less than 100 employees may not be organized oo a functional basis 
(Brownell & Dunk, 1991). Only the heads of both the production and marketing functions 
are selected to provide some degree of control for the level of seniority of the participants 
within the organizational hierarchy. The selection of a single manager from each 
functional area also ensures independence of observations. 
The selected companies were contacted by telephone to obtain the names of the two 
functional heads so that the questionnaire could be mailed directly to, and answered by, the 
intended participants. Twenty one companies could not be contacted3 and thirty nine 
companies reported that they were not actively involved in manufacturing in Victoria or 
New South Wales. Of the remaining 177 companies, 143 companies agreed to assist in the 
survey. This resulted in the identification of 143 production managers and 141 marketing 
managers. The questionnaire was administered to a sample of only 237 managers selected 
randomly from the 284 names obtained. Questionnaires were not mailed to all the names 
provided as an approximate number of 240 questionnaires were considered adequate for the 
survey. Moreover, managers who responded were provided with gift vouchers. Hence, only 
237 questionnaires were mailed to keep the cost of gift vouchers to an affordable level. 
The administration of the questionnaire involved the following steps. First, a letter 
explaining the objectives of the study was mailed to each of the intended participants. 
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-- --- -
This was followed a week later by the questionnaire with a covering letter (assuring 
participants confidentiality of information) and a reply-paid self-addressed envelope. 
Since prior research has indicated that small monetary incentives enhance survey response 
rates (Kanuk & Berenson, 1975; Heberlin & Baumgartner, 1978; Jaworski & Young, 1992), 
each respondent was promised a gift voucher if the questionnaire was returned in a useable 
form. Reminder letters were mailed to those who had not responded after three weeks of 
mailing of the questionnaire. 
One hundred and eight responses and three "return to sender" were received. Seven 
organizations contacted by telephone indicated that the managers have already left their 
organizations. This resulted in a response rate of 48%. Four responses were not usable as 
one respondent indicated that budgets were not used in the respondent's organization and 
the other three responses were not answered by either the production or marketing 
managers. This resulted in 104 usable responses.4 
The respondents comprise 52 production managers and 52 marketing managers. The 
managers have a mean age of 43; have an average of 11 years of experience in their area of 
responsibility; and have been in their current positions for an average of 4 years. Fifty 
seven percent of them have university qualifications and the average number of employees 
in their areas of responsibility is 103. These demographic data indicate that the 
respondents in general are highly qualified and experienced managers in highly 
responsible positions. 
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MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTS 
Propensity to create slack Propensity to create slack was measured by Onsi's (1973) 
instrument. The four-item Likert-scaled instrument measures the extent of the respondents' 
agreement to the statements that a manager (i) submits a safely attainable budget to 
protect himself/herself; (ii) sets different levels of standards with different levels of 
management to be safe; (iii) accepts a reasonable level of slack during good business times; 
and (iv) approves of slack as slack permits acts that cannot be officially approved to be 
carried out. Onsi's instrument was selected for this study as it is a much more established 
scale than Dunk's (1993) scale and has been tested and used by almost all the studies oo. 
budgetary slack involving questionnaire surveys with satisfactory reliability and validity 
(e.g., Merchant, 1985a; Govindarajan, 1986; Nouri, 1994; Nouri & Parker, 1996; Lal, Dunk 
and Smith, 1996). The Cronbach alphas obtained in this study is 0.67. Whilst this alpha 
is not high, it is above the 0.5 - 0.6 acceptable minimum (Nunnally, 1978; Merchant, 1985; 
Shields & Young, 1993), and as high as that obtained by Dunk (1993) with his instrument. 
A factor analysis also supported the unidimensional nature of the four items as they a 11 
loaded satisfactorily on a single factor. 
Budgetary performance This was measured by a modified version of the instrument 
developed by Kenis (1979). The instrument comprises a 2-item 7-point scale ranging from 
"Very rarely" to "Nearly all the time". Respondents were asked how often they meet 
their budget goals; and how often they have favorable budget variances. This instrument 
was chosen because the independent variables of Emphasis on tight budget targets and Cost 
control are budget-related controls and are more likely to affect budgetary performance 
rather than overall job performance (Brier & Hirst, 1990; Hirst & Lowy, 1990). The 
Cronbach alpha for this variable in this study is 0.68. 
Emphasis on tight budget targets This variable was measured with a 5-item, 7-point 
scale developed by Simons (1987). The instrument comprises questions relating to the 
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tightness and accuracy of budget goals, the use of summary measures of departmental 
performance, the importance of meeting budgeted targets and achieving operating 
efficiencies. The choice of this instrument is regarded as appropriate because this 
instrument emphasizes the importance of meeting tight budget targets and not just meeting 
budget targets. This distinction is important as it has been argued in this study that it is 
the meeting of tight budget targets (and not just the meeting of budget targets) that will 
affect the two dependent variables (propensity to create slack and budgetary performance). 
The Cronbach alpha of 0.65 obtained for this study is considered adequate (Nunnally, 
1978). The factor analysis indicates that the items of the instrument are unidimensional as 
they all loaded satisfactorily on a single factor. 
Cost control Cost control was measured using a 3-item, 7-point scale also developed by 
Simons (1987). The instrument includes questions relating to the use of cost centers, 
budgetary variance analysis and monitoring of all tasks by control systems. The Cronbach 
alpha for this subscales for this study is 0.64. A factor analysis also indicates that all the 
items loaded satisfactorily on a single factor. 
Summary statistics for these variables and their intercorrelations are shown in Tables 1 
and 2, respectively. As this research involves interaction regression models and non-ratio 
• scales, the problem of multicollinearity is a non-issue (Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990; Gul & 
Tsui, 1995). Gul & Tsui suggest that as the origins of non-ratio scales are arbitrary, the 
correlations between the independent variables can be reduced to zero by shifting the origin 
points of the scales. The signs and significance level of the interaction coefficients are not 
affected by any shift of the origin point. 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 here 
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RESULTS 
Regression models are used to analyze the data. The following models are used: 
Yi= bo + b1Ti + b3Ci + ei (Equation 1) 
Yi= bo + b1 Ti+ b2Ci + b3TiCi + ei (Equation 2) 
where Yi = Propensity to create slack (Ho1) or 
Budgetary performance (Ho2 ) 
Ti = Emphasis on tight budget targets 
Ci = Cost control 
Pi = Propensity to create slack 
5 
ei = Error term 
Hypothesis Hof Propensity to create slack 
Table 3 sho.ws the results of the regressions of Propensity to create slack en Emphasis oo 
tight budget target and Cost control. The results indicate that for the combined production 
and marketing manager sample, the main effect (Equation 1) of both Emphasis en tight 
budget targets and Cost control are significant (p :S 0.001 and p :::;; 0.015, respectively). The 
results also indicate that for Equation 2, the coefficient of the interaction term (b3) is 
• significant at p<0.039. The R2 of the two-way interaction model increases by 2.8% from the 
main effect model to 12.3%. 
Insert Table 3 here 
For the production subsample, Table 3 indicates that only Emphasis en tight budget targets 
has a significant and negative main effect en propensity to create slack (p :::;; 0.022 in 
Equation 1). Cost control has no significant main effect. The results also indicate that the 
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coefficient (b3) of the two-way interaction between Emphasis en tight budget targets and 
Cost control is, as expected, significant (p ~ 0.005, Equation 2) and negative. The 
incremental R2 explained by the two-way interaction is 12% with the R2 of the main effect 
model (Equation 1) increasing from 8.1 % to 20.1 %. 
For the marketing subsample, Table 3 indicates that only Emphasis en tight budget target 
has a significant (p ~ 0.026, Equation 1) and negative main effect. Both Cost control and 
the interaction between Cost control and Emphasis en tight budget targets are not 
significant. Hence, hypothesis H 01 , which states that there is no significant interaction 
between Emphasis en tight budget targets and Cost control affecting Propensity to create 
slack, is rejected only for the production managers .. 
The failure to reject Hypothesis H01 for the marketing function could be due to the lesser 
importance attached to Cost control in the marketing departments where revenues, rather 
than costs, are likely to be the paramount object of control. Marketing departments are 
likely to place greater emphasis en economic and environmental conditions and use less 
formalized accounting control procedures, because market innovation and administrative 
controls may be incompatible (Simons, 1987). In contrast, production departments are likely 
to use formal accom1ting controls (such as Cost control) to control their operations 
(Thompson, 1967; Hayes, 1977; Hirst, 1981, 1983, Simons, 1987), because cost incurrence is 
likely to constitute a more significant aspect of the production departments' operations 
than those of the marketing departments. This may explain why a significant interaction 
between Emphasis en tight budget targets and Cost control affecting Propensity to create 
slack was foWld for the production function but not for the marketing function. 
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Further analyses on the significant interaction for the production subsample 
To ascertain if Cost control exerts a positive influence on Propensity to create slack over the 
entire range of Emphasis on tight budget targets for the production subsample, the 
procedure suggested by Schoonhoven (1981) is used to determine the point of inflexion of the 
partial relation ay /c)Ti, that is, the level of Cost control at which a change in the 
Emphasis m tight budget targets has no effect on propensity to create slack. 
Mathematically, the relation between Emphasis on tight budget targets (Ti) and 
propensity to create slack (Yi) as influenced by Cost control (Ci) can be shown as: ay /dTi = 
b1 + b3Ci. 
The point of inflexion for the production subsample is 14.3, calculated as: -b1/b3. As the 
observed range of Cost control scores for the production subsample is between 7 and 21 and the 
mean is 16.74, the point of inflexion lies within the observed range and is close to the mean. 
Emphasis on tight budget targets therefore has a nonmonotonic effect m Propensity to create 
slack over the observed range of Cost control. This means that even though Emphasis m 
tight budget targets has a significant main effect m propensity to create slack (p ~ 0.022, 
Equation l, Table 3), this main effect is not meaningful (Kerlinger & Pedhazur, 1973, p. 246) 
as the effect of Emphasis m tight budget target is positive in the Cost control range below 
14.3 and negative in the range above 14.3. These relationships are shown in Figure 1. 
Insert Figure 1, Table 4 and Figure 2 here 
To further assist in the interpretation of the significant results pertaining to the t~o-way 
interaction between Emphasis on tight budget targets and Cost control affecting Propensity 
to create slack for the production subsample, both Emphasis on tight budget targets and Cost 
control are dichotomized at their respective means and the results presented in Table 4 and 
Figure 2. Table 4 and Figure 2 indicate that a compatible combination of high Emphasis m 
tight budget targets and high Cost control has the lowest mean score (11.8) of propensity to 
create slack. This is consistent with the hypothesis that for accounting controls to be 
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effective in reducing Propensity to create slack, there should be a high extent of planning 
and setting accurate and tight budget and a high extent of control and follow-up to ensure 
that planned targets are achieved. 
Table 4 and Figure 2 indicate that Propensity to create slack is also low with a compatible 
combination of low Emphasis on tight budget targets and low Cost control (mean score = 
12.5). Since both the accounting controls are low, it is plausible that top management is 
relying en other forms of control to achieve operating efficiency. There is therefore ro 
incentive for subordinates to build slack. Hence, the Propensity to create slack is low. 
Table 4 and Figure 2 indicates that Propensity to create slack is high when Emphasis m 
tight targets is high and Cost control is low (16.2); and when Emphasis en tight targets is 
low and Cost control is high (14.5). These results indicate that Propensity to create slack is 
highest when there is inconsistency in the implementation of the two accounting control 
system attributes and hence are consistent with the theory that the effectiveness of the two 
accounting control system attributes is dependent upon the joint application of the two 
attributes. Whilst the presence of only one of the two control system attributes is not likely 
to create fear among subordinates that slack creation will be detected (because of the low 
sophistication of accounting controls), it is nevertheless still likely to induce the stress and 
the pressure for the subordinates to create slack. Hence, Propensity to create slack is high 
when only one of the two control system attributes is present. 
The results indicate that a high Emphasis on tight budget targets is associated with the 
highest level of propensity to create slack (16.2) when it is not implemented with a high 
Cost control; but is associated with the lowest level of Propensity to create slack (11.8) 
when it is implemented jointly with a high Cost control. These results highlight the 
importance of Cost control and suggest that the failure to control for the extent of Cost 
control may account for the conflicting results of prior studies which examined the impact of 
the importance of Meeting the budget on Propensity to create slack. 
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Table 4 also indicates that the high Emphasis on tight budget targets and high Cost control 
combination (which is the most effective combination for reducing Propensity to create 
slack) is also the cell with the highest number of respondent (18). The high Emphasis en 
tight targets and low Cost control combination, which is the least effective combination in 
reducing Propensity to create slack, has the lowest number of respondents (5). This 
combination is unusual as a high Emphasis en tight budget targets is normally expected to 
be accompanied by a high extent of Cost control. The ineffectiveness of this combination to 
reduce Propensity to create slack may account for its unpopularity among the production 
departments. 
Hypothesis Ho2 : Budgetary perfonnance 
Table 5 presents the results of the regressions of Budgetary performance en Emphasis en 
tight budget targets and Cost control. The results indicate that for the combined production 
and marketing sample, both Emphasis en tight budget targets and Cost control have ro 
significant main effects en Budgetary performance (Equation 1). However, the results 
indicate that the coefficient (b3} of the interaction between Emphasis en tight budget 
targets and Cost control is, as expected, highly significant (p ~ 0.008, Equation 2) and 
positive. The two-way interaction increases the R2 of the main effect model by 5.5% to 
• 10.4%. Similar results are obtained for both the production subsample and the marketing 
subsample. Hypothesis H02, which states that there is no significant interaction between 
Emphasis en tight budget targets and Cost control affecting Budgetary performance, is 
rejected for both the production and marketing functions. This suggests that a combination 
of high Emphasis on tight budget targets and a high Cost control is effective in increasing 
subordinates' Budgetary performance in both the production and marketing departments. 
Hence null hypothesis H02, which states that there is no significant interaction between 
Emphasis en tight budget targets and Cost control affecting subordinates' Budgetary 
performance, is rejected. 
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Insert Table 5 here 
To ascertain if Cost control exerts a positive influence on Budgetary performance over the 
entire range of Emphasis on tight budget targets, the procedure suggested by Schoonhoven 
(1981) is used to determine the point of inflexion of the partial relation ay ;aTi, that is, the 
level of Cost control at which a change in the Emphasis on tight budget targets has ro 
effect on Budgetary performance. The point of inflexion is 13 for the pooled (combined 
production and marketing) sample. As the observed range of Cost control scores for the 
pooled sample is between 7 and 21 and the mean is 16.47, the point of inflexion lies within 
the observed range of Cost control and is close to the mean. Emphasis on tight budget 
targets therefore has a nonmonotonic effect on Budgetary performance over the observed 
range of Cost control. Figure 3 shows that the effect of Emphasis en tight budget target is 
positive over the range of Cost control above 13, and negative for the range of Cost control 
below 13. 
Insert Figure 3, Table 6 and Figure 4 here 
• To further assist in the interpretation of the significant two-way interaction results, both 
Emphasis en tight budget targets and Cost control are dichotomized at their respective 
means and the results presented in Table 6 and graphically presented in Figure 4. Table 6 
and Figure 4 indicate that Budgetary performance is highest when Emphasis en tight 
budget targets and Cost control are both high (10.65). These results are consistent with the 
expectation that the highest level of Budgetary performance is associated with the cell 
where both control system attributes are high. 
Budgetary performance is lowest in the cell where both control system attributes are low 
(mean= 9.36). The low emphasis on financial controls suggests that the budgetary system 
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is probably not important and that other forms of control are in place to achieve efficiency. 
Since the budgetary system is not important, achieving a high level of Budgetary 
performance is probably also unimportant. Hence, there are few incentives for the 
subordinates to expend the effort to achieve high Budgetary performance. 
As only organizations with budgetary systems are included in this study, and since a 
compatible combination of high Emphasis oo tight budget targets and high Cost control is 
associated with high Budgetary performance, it is not surprising that this combination has 
the highest number of respondents (40 out of 104, Table 6). The cell with the next highest 
number of respondents (33) is the low Emphasis on tight budget targets and low Cost control 
combination. This result is also not surprising as a low Emphasis oo tight budget target is 
expected to be associated with a low emphasis oo Cost control. Finally, as expected, the 
1;,I 
other two cells, involving incompatible combinations of high (low) Emphasis oo tight It 
budget target and low (high) Cost control, have the lowest number of respondents (12 and 
19, respectively). 
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CONCLUSION 
This study provides empirical evidence on the interactive effect of Emphasis on tight 
budget targets and Cost control. These two accounting control system attributes are probably 
among the ~ost commonly used accounting controls in many organizations. Yet, it is 
surprising that there is a dearth of research evidence on how these two control system 
attributes interact to affect the achievement of organizational objectives. 
The results of this study provide a plausible explanation for the prior studies' conflicting 
results on the association between the importance of Meeting the budget and the Propensity 
to create slack. The evidence suggests that the extent of Cost control may be the important 
omitted variable in prior studies. Cost control interacts significantly with Emphasis en 
tight budget targets to affect: (i) the production managers' Propensity to create slack; and 
(ii) both the production and the marketing managers' Budgetary performance. 
A number of limitations exist in this study. First, the measurement instruments for the two 
accounting control system attributes are recently developed instruments and have not been 
widely used. The moderate levels of Cronbach alpha for Emphasis on tight budget targets 
and Cost control indicate a need for further refinement of these instruments or the use of 
other alternative instruments to retest the hypotheses of this study. Second, the inclusion 
of the word "slack" in the instrument for Propensity to create slack may have biased the 
respondents' scores since the word "slack" generally has a negative social stigma (Dunk, 
1993). Third, as the sample was derived from senior production and marketing managers of 
private sector manufacturing organizations, the results of this study can only be generalized 
to the senior management of the production and marketing functions of private sector 
manufacturing organizations. Opportunities exist to extend this study to lower and middle 
level management, to other functional areas (e.g., human resource management, accounting, 
administration), to non manufacturing organizations and to public sector organizations. 
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Opportunities also exist to examine the interaction effects of other accounting control system 
attributes, such as External scanning and Results monitoring (Simons, 1987), on other 
dependent variables, such as job-related tension, role conflict and role ambiguity. Finally, 
this study have only emphasized formalized accounting procedures and systems involving 
information use. It has not considered informal control mechanisms such as social and 
cultural control (Jaeger, 1983; Harrison, 1992) which could also influence subordinates' 
propensity to create slack and performance. Testing the effects of these informal controls 
will be beneficial. 
Nevertheless, despite the limitations above, this study provides additional evidence 
regarding the complex issue of budgetary slack and budgetary performance. The focus m 
the role of accounting system control attributes to counter slack also represents the 
accoW\tants' and superiors' (rather than the subordinates') role in slack creation (reduction), 
an interesting and relatively unexplored area in management accounting research. 
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Footnotes 
1. Accounting control systems is defined as "formalized procedures and systems that use 
information to maintain or alter patterns in organizational activity" (Simons, 1987, 
p.358). 
2. Manufacturing companies were selected because the use of budgets in these 
organizations is common. Non-manufacturing companies were excluded from the 
sample to provide some control over factors arising from differences in activities 
undertaken by manufacturing and non-manufacturing organizations. Victoria and 
New South Wales were selected as these two states have the highest concentration 
of manufacturing operations in Australia. 
3. These companies could have moved, ceased operations or changed their telephone 
numbers. 
4. The non-response bias tests suggested by Oppenheim {1992) indicate that there were 
no significant differences between the early and late respondents. 
5. Tests on the adequacy of the multiple linear regression models indicate that the inherent 
assumptions of the models were satisfied by the data. 
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TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics for independent and dependent variables 
Theoretical range Actual range 
Variables Mean Std dev Min Max Min Max 
Emphasis on tight 
targets 27.44 3.89 5 35 15 35 
Cost Control 16.47 3.21 3 21 7 21 
Propensity for slack 12.04 4.62 4 28 4 22 
Budgetary performance 9.92 2.07 2 14 3 14 
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TABLE 2: Correlation matrix 
among independent and dependent variables 
Emphasis 
on tight Cost 
Variables targets control 
Cost control 0.54 .... 
Propensity for slack -0.23• 0.05 
Budget performance 
.... 
.. 
P::. 0.01 
p:::. 0.05 
0.21"' 0.17 
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Propensity 
for slack 
-0.20· 
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TABLE 3: Results of regression of Propensity to create slack on Emphasis on tight budget targets 
and Cost control for the production managers, marketing managers and the combined group. 
Variable Coeff 
Constant ho 
Emphasis on tight targets (T) b1 
Cost control (C) 
TxC 
R2 
F value 
p~ 
R2 explained by 
2-way interaction terms = 
b2 
b3 
Production function Marketing function Combined production & marketing 
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 1 Equation 2 
(Main) (Interaction) (Main) (Interaction) (Main) (Interaction) 
Est p Est . p Est p Est p Est p Est p 
19.36 
-0.38 
0.25 
0.001 
0.022 
0.142 
0.081 
2.17 
0.063 
-34.52 
1.86 
3.33 
-0.13 
0.050 
0.017 
0.003 
0.005 
0.201 
4.04 
0.006 
12.0% 
16.18 
-0.395 
0.349 
0.001 
0.026 
0.072 
0.077 
2.05 
0.070 
14.18 
-0.32 
0.48 
-0.01 
0.248 
0.342 
0.362 
0.461 
0.077 
1.34 
0.136 
0.0% 
17.95 
-0.43 
0.35 
0.001 
0.001 
0.015 
0.095 
5.33 
0.003 
-6.71 
0.55 
1.85 
-0.06 
0.318 
0.167 
0.017 
0.039 
0.123 
4.69 
0.002 
2.8% 
' 
' 
_J 
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Figure 1 
Relationship of Emphasis on tight budget targets, Cost control 
and Propensity to create slack: Production subsample 
1.00 
0 
-1.00 
dY 
dTi 
7 
dY/ dTi= 
l.86 -0.13 (Ci*) 
Cost control 
*Ci= Cost control score 
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TABLE 4: Cell mean, standard deviation and frequencies for Propensity to create slack across high 
and low Emphasis on tight budget targets and Cost control (Production managers only) 
Cost control 
Emphasis on tight targets Low High 
Low 
y = 12.5 y = 14.5 
Sy = 4.3 Sy = 3.9 
n = 13 n = 16 
-
High y = 16.2 y = 11.8 
Sy = 3.9 Sy = 4.8 
n = 5 n = 18 
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Figure 2: Two-way interaction between Emphasis on tight budget targets and 
Cost control affecting Propensity to create slack (Production managers only) 
Propensity 
16 
14 
12 
I 1.8 
10 
Low High 
Emphasis on tight targets 
CC = Cost control 
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TABLE 5: Results of regression of Budgetary performance on Emphasis on tight budget targets 
and Cost control for the production managers, marketing managers and the combined group. 
Variable Coe ff 
Constant bo 
Emphasis on tight targets (T) b1 
Cost control (C) 
Tx C 
n2 
F value 
p$ 
n2 explained by 
2-way interaction terms = 
b2 
b3 
Production function Marketing function Combined production & marketing 
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 1 Equation 2 
(Main) (Interaction) (Main) (Interaction) (Main) (Interaction) 
Est p Est p Est p Est p Est p Est p 
4.37 
0.12 
0.11 
0.033 
0.091 
0.166 
0.094 
2.55 
0.044 
22.79 
-0.64 
-0.94 
0.04 
0.018 
0.074 
0.061 
0.040 
0.151 
2.85 
0.024 
5.7% 
8.75 
0.03 
0.05 
0.001 
0.359 
0.325 
0.018 
0.44 
0.322 
23.47 
-0.52 
-0.92 
0.04 
0.004 
0.054 
0.049 
0.039 
0.080 
1.39 
0.129 
6.2% 
6.63 
0.09 
0.05 
0.001 
0.067 
0.267 
0.049 
2.59 
0.040 
22.15 
-0.52 
-0.90 
0.04 
0.001 
0.022 
0.011 
0.008 
0.104 
3.87 
0.006 
5.5% 
Figure 3 
Relationship of Emphasis on tight budget targets, Cost control and Budgetary performance: 
Combined production and marketing managers sample 
0.32 
0 
-0.24 
dY 
dTi 
7 
dY/ dTi= 
21 
Cost control 
*Ci= Cost control score 
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TABLE 6: Cell mean, standard deviation and frequencies for Budgetary performance 
across high and low Emphasis on tight budget targets and Cost control 
(Combined production and marketing managers) 
Cost control 
Emphasis on tight targets Low High 
--
Low 
y = 9.36 y = 9.68 
Sy = 2.51 5y = 1.80 
n = 33 n = 19 
-
High y = 9.42 y = 10.65 
Sy = 2.23 Sy = 1.51 
n = 12 n = 40 
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Figure 4: Two-way interaction between Emphasis on tight budget targets 
and Cost control affecting Budgetary performance 
(Combined production and marketing managers) 
Performance 
11 10.65 
10 
9 9.36 
Low CC 9.42 
8 
Low High 
Emphasis on tight targets 
CC = Cost control 
End of paper 
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